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ABSTRACT
A significant increase in the seaborne trade for coal over the past twenty years
has unified formerly separate coal markets into a world market in which prices move in
tandem. Due to its large domestic market, the United States has become the residual
supplier and price setter in the world coal market. Changes in multifactor productivity
have been the primary cause of the long-term fluctuations in coal prices that have been
observed in the United States since the end of the Second World War and in the world
coal market.
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INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have witnessed the emergence of a world market in coal
that is very different from the localized and specialized markets that existed prior to the
1970s. With the restructuring and integration of Europe, the price established in this
market, the world coal price, will become the benchmark against which the restructured
coal industries of Europe, East and West, will be judged. The world coal price will also
increasingly become the standard against which other fuels, natural gas and fuel oil,
that would compete with coal for the electric utility market, will be measured.
The purpose of this paper is not to provide an exact number, much less a
projection of the world coal prices. Rather, it is to establish three basic propositions
concerning the existence and formation of the world price of coal. In simplest form, the
propositions can be stated as:
A unified world coal market exists.
The United States is the residual supplier and price setter for the world coal market.
Changes in coal mining productivity determine the trend of coal prices in the United
States, and thus in the world coal market.
A UNIFIED WORLD COAL MARKET
The rapid expansion of the seaborne trade in coal over the past two decades has
provided the vital link in unifying what had previously been separate domestic coal
markets. Two factors are primarily responsible for the growth of the seaborne trade in
coal. The first was the development, beginning in the late 1960s, of export-oriented
mines, chiefly in Australia and Canada, to meet Japan's increasing needs for
metallurgical coals and to reduce dependence on the United States. The second factor
was the sharp increase in oil prices during the 1970s which greatly expanded steam
coal markets. Low oil prices before 1973 had severely restricted steam coals to markets
close to the mines, but thereafter, when coal's high transport costs no longer seemed
such a disadvantage, distant fuel oil markets were opened. The effect of these two
factors is illustrated by Figure One which shows the doubling of the volume of
internationally traded coal since 1970. Figure One also portrays the shift in the means of
shipment as the market has expanded. Overland shipments, which had constituted forty
percent of the total in 1970 are now reduced to about five percent, or twenty million metric
tons of trade within Europe and between the US and Canada.
The world coal market does not yet include all world coal production, but only that
part which is more or less freely traded and linked by the seaborne trade in coal.
Presently, somewhere between a third and a half of the 3.5 billion metric tons of coal
produced annually would be included in this category. Until now, the former Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, China, India and parts of Western Europe were separate and
usually protected coal markets, only marginally linked to the world market; however, with
restructuring, a larger share of world coal production will become part of the world coal
market.
The world coal market encompasses both coking or metallurgical coal and steam
or thermal coal. Coking coal is a special type of highly processed coal possessing
certain chemical and mineral characteristics of value in the manufacture of steel,
whereas steam coal comprises the more pedestrian and diverse coals that are
combusted for no other purpose than to produce heat. With adequate processing, many
steam coals can be used as coking coals, so that the coking coal market can be thought
of as one part of the world coal market in which premiums are paid for certain
characteristics. Furthermore, as steel making technology evolves in a direction that
reduces the demand for coking coals, many formerly metallurgical coals no longer
undergo the extra processing and are sold as steam coals. Accordingly, it is most useful
to think of the world coal market as a steam coal or energy market, in which coking coals
are just one of the many forms of differentiation of the basic commodity.
Reference is often made to Pacific and Atlantic markets for coal, but these labels
must be understood as only geographic terms without meaningful economic distinction.
In fact, the best evidence of the unity of the world coal market, and of the existence of a
world coal price, is the very similar movement of prices in these geographically distinct
regions, as seen on Figure Two which shows the average CIF value for steam coal
imported into Japan and the EEC. The coals being shipped to each of these importers
are quite different, as are of course the buyers; and yet, despite the different origins,
contracting and purchasing requirements, the average prices not only move together but
are almost identical.
When netted back to the exporters, the price levels are different according to
location and quality of coal, but the same degree of covariance would be observed. The
explanation for the observed unity of pricing is not just South Africa, that can readily move
coal supplies from one basin to the other, but the ready contestability of these
geographic markets by exporters who for locational reasons are not locally dominant.
For instance, most steam coal from the US is exported to Europe, but some still goes to
importers in the Pacific in direct competition with Australia. Similarly, most Australian
4steam coal is exported to Asia, but some still goes to Europe in direct competition with
US coal. The result is a unified world coal market.
THE UNITED STATES AS THE RESIDUAL SUPPUER
There is no commodity exchange that aggregates bids and offers to establish a
common reference price for coal, such as exists for Brent crude, tin or wheat. Instead,
there are quotes and representative prices, which can be readily found in the trade
press, for purchases CIF Rotterdam or Yokohama, or FOB port in the US, South Africa,
Australia or Canada. As shown in Figure Two, these prices move together as if there
were a common reference price. The appropriate analogue for the world coal market is
not the commodity exchange, but the world crude oil market as it functioned during the
years 1973 through 1986, when the world oil price was established by a residual
supplier, in that case, Saudi Arabia. The applicability of this analogue is suggested by
the occasional reference in the industry and trade press to the United States as the
"swing supplier" among the coal exporting nations.
The position of the United States as the residual supplier can be seen first in the
more cyclical volume of US coal exports. Figure Three compares the export levels of the
four principal coal exporters, the US, Australia, South Africa, and Canada, since 1970.
The patterns among the four are very different. Although well established today,
Australia, South Africa and Canada were new entrants to the seaborne coal trade in the
early 1970s. Their exports have increased steadily over the intervening two decades,
almost regardless of market condition, as would be expected of new entrants who are
inframarginal producers. In contrast, US exports have fluctuated greatly, reflecting market
conditions, as might be expected of a residual supplier; but US exports remain in 1993
at approximately the same tonnage as in 1970.
The residual position of the United States can also be observed in the continual
yielding of market share by the United States to new entrants who are willing and able to
compete to gain market share. Those who were the new entrants in the 1970s are now
the principal coal exporters, but a new set of market entrants has appeared in the 1980s.
China, Indonesia and Colombia now export about 15 million tons a year each, while the
newest entrant Venezuela has only recently begun to increase production and exports.
All were minor to nonexistent coal exporters as recently as 1980. Whether the more
recent new entrants will follow the same course as Australia, South Africa and Canada
is yet to be seen, but there is demonstrably no difficulty in entering the world coal market.
The continuing entry of new exporters into the world coal market has diminished the US
share of total seaborne exports. As seen in Figure Four, the US share has fallen from
just under half in 1970 to about 15% today. Today's US share is half that of Australia, and
approximately equal to Canada and South Africa together or the total exports of the four
newest entrants.
The importance of the residual supplier resides not so much in its share as in its
capability to meet incremental demand, as was demonstrated in the years around 1980.
US exports increased by 60 million tons from 1978 through 1981 when suddenly
increased demand, due to the 1979-80 hike in crude oil prices, was joined with
restricted supplies, caused by the Solidarity strikes in Poland. In the next two years,
when the subsequent world wide recession took effect and Polish exports resumed, it
was the US that absorbed the slack as US coal exports fell by 30 million tons.
Capability to meet incremental demand derives from a large and open domestic
market. Figure Five shows the extraordinary disproportion between exported and
domestically consumed production for the principal exporters. US coal exports are
produced principally in only one of the country's three major producing regions,
Appalachia; but even so that one region produces annually more than twice that of
Australia, now the largest exporter in the world coal market. Only the United States
possesses the current capability to produce for a domestic market large enough to
accommodate easily increments of demand in the world coal market. In this respect, the
position of the United States cannot be matched by any of the other principal exporters
today, and eventually only by China or perhaps Russia.
The position of the United States as residual supplier to the world coal market
suggests that the world price of coal would be determined in general by the price of coal
in the United States, and more specifically , the price at which American coal is available
at US ports, typically Hampton Roads, the largest port servicing Appalachia. In fact, the
trend in these two prices is remarkably similar, as shown in Figures Six and Seven.
Figure Six presents the bituminous coal component of the Producer Price Index for the
United States since the late 1940s. Figure Seven presents the price of coking coal
imported into Japan from various destinations since the mid-1960s. As can be readily
seen, the real price of coal in the United States, and (since the 1970s) in the world coal
market, has not followed a smooth trend. There have been three distinct periods since
the end of the Second World War: falling prices for approximately twenty years until the
late 1960s, sharply rising prices in the 1970s, and the resumption of declining prices in
the 1980s and 1990s.
So long as the US is the residual supplier to the world coal market, the price of
coal in its large domestic market will matter more than the domestic price of any other
exporter. Accordingly, the price at which coal is available in US ports provides the marker
against which buyers and sellers in the world coal market measure bids and offers.
New entrants, or existing exporters, wishing to expand share, must match the delivered
equivalent of this price; for buyers are not likely to pay more than the same for additional
supplies. Likewise, those who would import coal from the United States must bid it away
from the ample home market. Thus, the US price, and specifically that which prevails in
the Appalachian region, forms the base for the world price of coal.
DETERMINANTS OF THE U.S. AND WORLD PRICE OF COAL
If the price of coal in the United States determines the world price of coal, the
remaining question must be what determines the price of coal in the United States. Our
concern here is not annual perturbations, but the longer term movements that are so
evident in Figures Six and Seven.
The alternating trends in the price of coal roughly coincide with what were viewed
as the dominant realities of the industry during each of the periods: loss of market share
to oil and natural gas during the 1950s and 1960s, rising crude oil prices in the 1970s,
and over-capacity in the 1980s. These conditions probably contributed to the observed
changes in output price, but in each period, they fail to provide a satisfactory explanation.
For instance, loss of market did occur during the 1950s; but coal production increased
by about 45% during the 1960s due to rapid growth in the demand for electricity. Thus,
although declining markets would tend to depress price, this cause cannot explain the
persistent decline in the real price of coal that continued through the 1960s.
The sharp increase in coal prices during the 1970s is often attributed to higher oil
prices, but there was no marked increase in the rate of growth in coal production. Higher
crude oil prices undoubtedly sustained the demand for coal; but, the crude oil price
shocks do not show up as surges of demand that would have pressed existing
productive capacity to the limit and caused coal prices to rise.
The influence of crude oil prices on coal prices can be further questioned by
juxtaposing the trend of petroleum product prices and coal prices over the same period,
as is shown by Figure Eight. Both coal and oil prices increased in the 1970s, but that is
where the similarity ends. There is no discernible reflection of the second OPEC oil price
increase in 1979-80, nor of the oil price collapse in 1986. More pertinent, coal prices
started increasing sharply in 1970 and had risen by about half the total increase by
1973, when the first oil price shock hit. Thus, crude oil price increases may have
contributed to the sharp increase in coal prices during the 1970s, but the price of crude
oil has not been the primary determinant of coal prices.
It is the conventional wisdom in the coal industry in the United States that the
falling coal prices of the 1980s reflect over-capacity. Exuberant expectations very likely
did cause investment to outrun demand during the early 1980s with the result that
excess capacity was created and prices depressed. Nevertheless, this explanation
offers at best a short-term explanation, and it is not sufficient to explain what is now
almost a twenty year trend of declining prices. Furthermore, production has continued to
increase, (by almost 50% since coal prices started to decline in the late 1970s), and
new capacity has been regularly brought on line both to replace exhausted mines and to
meet new demand.
Changing labor productivity, has been adduced as one of the causes of the
increase in coal prices during the 1970s. Labor productivity did deteriorate markedly in
the 1970s, and it improved steadily during the 1950s and 1960s, and from the 1980s on.
The failure to relate improving labor productivity to coal price movements during periods
other than the 1970s is notable, but understandable in that wage rates and capital
requirements were rising at the same time. Absent measures for other factors of
production, it was not clear what was the net balance of these considerations.
The data to address the broader question of multifactor productivity at the industry
level has become available only recently due to the efforts of Dale Jorgenson and his
colleagues. Jorgenson's data provides quality-adjusted measures of price and quantity
for four factors - capital, labor, energy and materials - and the appropriate gross
measures of output and price for the coal industry from the late 1940s through 1985.2
From this data, a share-weighted index of multifactor productivity change can be created
for the past 40 years, as well as the inverse, an index of unit input, which indicates the
amount of each factor used in the production of one unit of output. As the inverse,
declining unit input corresponds to increasing productivity which with unchanging factor
prices implies falling prices; and, vice versa, for rising unit input.
The most striking aspect of the unit input index is the correspondence with the
trend in output price as shown at Figure Nine. Unit input and output price decline at
approximately equal rates through the 1950s and 1960s, as would be expected if factor
prices remain unchanged. The 1970s are characterized by rising unit input and rising
output price, although at different rates. By the end of what appears to be a decade of
technical regress, sixty percent more aggregate input is required to produce a unit of
output, and that input costs some forty percent more in real terms. Then, technological
progress seems to reappear and unit input and prices decline steadily again. The
turning points and magnitudes of output price and productivity change are not exact; but
the unit input index leaves little doubt that changing productivity is the major explanatory
factor for the trend in coal prices in the United States since the end of the Second World
War.
A complete accounting of the change is output price during the three post-war
phases is presented in Table One. Improving productivity is the principal explanation for
declining prices through the late 1960s and from the 1980s on. The 1970s stand out not
only for the sharp reversal of productivity, but also rising real factor prices which account
for about forty percent of the increase in output price.
The explanation for the periods of falling real price can be readily credited to the
technological progress that appears as improving multifactor productivity, but periods of
technical regress are unusual and call for some explanation. There does not appear to
have been any cessation of engineering improvements during this period. For instance,
productivity enhancing innovations, such as longwall mining systems and draglines,
continued to be introduced. The appearance is that technological progress did not stop,
but was overwhelmed by something else. A complete analysis of the causes of the
declining productivity of the US coal mining industry in the 1970s cannot be presented
here, but the likely causes can be identified.
First, the decline in productivity coincided with a period of intense legislative and
regulatory activity aimed at internalizing non-market costs of coal mining. The two most
notable instances are the Mine Health and Safety Act, enacted in 1969, and state and
federal surface mining laws. Both of these regulatory efforts imposed numerous
requirements on coal mining that had the effect of requiring additional equipment,
materials, labor and energy.
A second probable cause is the effect of the UMWA-BCOA labor agreements that
terminated the major strikes of 1974 and 1977. The 1970s were years of almost
ritualistic strikes by unionized labor at the time of contract renegotiation, as well as
wildcat strikes between, all of which diminished labor productivity. These strikes
occurred at times of great concern about energy supplies, provoking presidential
intervention in 1978, and a general expectation, born of the 1973 oil price increase, that
the demand for coal would increase dramatically. Under the circumstances, it is not hard
to imagine that the contract settlements were motivated more by a desire to get the
mines back into production than to resist union demands for requirements that would
impair productivity. Furthermore, coal prices were already rising and there was little
reason to think that higher costs could not be passed on.
Indirect support for the effect of the contract settlements can be found in the
remarkable decline of the union share of production since then. In the early 1970s, about
two-thirds of national production was produced in union mines. Twenty years later, when
national production is some 75% greater, the union share of production is less than a
third. The most obvious explanation is that union mines bear higher costs than non-
union mines, and that the penalty has been what could be expected.
Given the structure of the world coal market, changing coal mining productivity in
the United States has determined the world price of coal. When the cost of producing
coal in the United States rose during the 1970s, the price of coal from all other exporters
rose similarly, as shown by Figure Seven. And when production costs and prices in the
United States declined in the 1980s, the price received by competing exporters declined
as well. It is quite easy to imagine that the technological improvements that seem to
account for the declining prices for most of the post-war period were available
elsewhere, so that costs and prices would move in tandem; however, it would be quite
extraordinary if the cost increases experienced in the United States in the 1970s were
similarly replicated among exporters as diverse in circumstance as Australia, Poland
and South Africa. The more likely case is that the rising world price of coal, reflecting the
circumstances of the residual supplier, created the profits and subsequent new
supplies that have diminished the subsequent US share of the expanding world coal
market.
Although the technical regress of the 1970s may have been restricted to the
United States, there is nothing unique about the technological changes that have
caused prices to fall since the late 1970s. Technological improvements are notoriously
hard to restrict to national borders; and there is very little reason to think that the
improvements in productivity that can be observed in the United States did not occur
elsewhere. Accordingly, the third proposition may provide a more robust explanation for
the world price of coal, one that is not restricted to the residual supplier model, but would
apply equally if countries with domestic markets and reserve positions comparable to
the US, namely, China and Russia, become more than incidental participants in the
world coal market.
IMPUCATIONS FOR EUROPE
The effect of the three propositions that have been advanced in this paper is that
Europe can obtain coal from a large international market where supplies are quite
adequate and prices have been steadily declining. For any point in Europe, coal is
available at the world price plus freight. As a result, that price will become increasingly
the standard for determining Europe's coal production and consumption.
The ready availability of coal at competitive prices on the world coal market does
not necessarily mean that all European production will be displaced by imports, as is
being demonstrated in the United Kingdom. Three circumstances work towards the
continuation of some domestic mines. First, not all domestic mines are high cost,
uneconomic mines. Second, even for mines which appear uneconomic, the
combination of factors in use in protected industries is rarely the most efficient. The
same policy framework that allows protectionism permits the pursuit of other social
goals, such as employment, that are not always compatible with competitive prices. With
the abandonment of these policies, and often the adoption of more recent technology,
unit costs can be brought down to the level of import prices.
The third circumstance promoting the continuation of some domestic production
is a subtle legacy of past protection. Transportation costs cause industries dependent
on coal to locate close to the mines, but those industries cannot easily relocate if
imports become the cheaper source of coal. Where the domestic mines are inland, the
sunk costs of past industrial location create an advantage for those mines, equal to
transportation cost from the coast. When combined with decent geological conditions,
more efficient use of factors, and technological innovation, more of the protected industry
may survive than would at first seem likely.
Finally, and despite the disclaimer at the beginning, a comment may be permitted
on the likely future trend in the world coal price. When seeking to determine future prices,
it is customary to develop supply curves that represent the costs, based on today's
reserves and technology, at which successive increments of production can be brought
to market. Invariably, these supply curves are very flat, but they do rise as increasingly
greater demands are placed upon existing reserves. When future, and typically
increasing, demand is projected against these static supply curves, rising prices are
indicated at the time when the future demand is expected to materialize. What is not
being captured in these exercises is what will be learned between today, when the
supply curves are estimated, and tomorrow, when the increased demands will be
realized. For most of our past experience, the process of learning and continual
improvement that we call technological progress has shifted the gently rising supply
curves downward so that the actual path of realized prices when traced through time has
been falling.
Forces that would counter the effect of continuing technological progress in coal
are hard to identify. Depletion of coal reserves on a global scale is too distant a
possibility to have any effect, and long-term coal supply is sufficiently elastic that rising
oil and natural gas prices will have more effect on the quantity demanded than on the
price of coal. Over-capacity may imply a higher price when the excess is wrung out, but
no long term trend is implied. The argument must be recognized for what it is - a
reflection of disappointed price expectations -- rather than an accurate description of
what has been occurring in the world coal market for the past fifteen years. Any notion of
rising prices due to cartel-like behavior by producers can be set aside given the
dispersion of world coal reserves, the demonstrated ease of entry, and the super
competitive behavior of existing coal producers.
Future coal prices will depend on the trend in the costs of production, very much
as they have in the past. So long as the United States is the residual supplier to the
world coal market, productivity trends in the US coal industry will be the more important
than elsewhere, but this is not to say that there is anything unique about productivity
change in the American coal industry, nor that the structure of the world coal market will
not change over time. China and Russia are coal producing giants with comparable
reserves who to date have been only incidental participants in the world coal market.
Given the events since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we can envisage a time when there
would be no clearly identifiable residual supplier, but it is hard to imagine that the
competitive nature of the world coal market would be any different, or prices based on
anything other than the costs of production as determined by future technological
change among all coal producers and exporters.
It may seem very speculative to forecast what we will learn tomorrow, or
equivalently, the rate at which our current ignorance will be reduced; but not to do so is to
adopt an assumption of technological stagnation that defies the historical record, not
only for coal but for other industries, and economic activity in general. In this
circumstance, the extrapolation of past experience is not without merit. A bias towards
declining prices merely reflects confidence in mankind's continuing ability to wring more
from nature.
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Fig 3: PRINCIPAL COAL EXPORTERS
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Fig 5: EXPORT DEPENDENCE
Selected Coal Exporters, 1992
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Fig 6: US COAL PRICE
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Fig 8: U.S. COAL AND OIL PRICES
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Fig 9: U.S. COAL PRICE AND
PRODUCTIVITY
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TABLE 1: DECOMPOSITION OF OUTPUT PRICE CHANGE
U.S. Coal Industry, 1947-1989
Indices Annual Rates of Change
1947 1969 1979 1989 1947-69 1969-79 1979-89
REAL OUTPUT PRICE 100 68 172 96 -1.75% 9.30% -5.82%
FACTOR PRICE INDEX 100 95 140 125 -0.24% 3.87% -1.07%
LABOR 100 136 207 218 1.39% 4.23% 0.50%
CAPITAL 100 36 58 54 -4.66% 4.88% -0.86%
ENERGY 100 68 156 98 -1.73% 8.26% -4.62%
MATERIALS 100 102 99 90 0.07% -0.24% -0.94%
UNIT INPUT INDEX 100 72 124 77 -1.51% 5.43% -4.75%
LABOR 100 47 64 29 -3.46% 3.14% -7.87%
CAPITAL 100 149 269 229 1.82% 5.88% -1.60%
ENERGY 100 77 122 91 -1.18% 4.58% -2.94%
MATERIALS 100 117 297 199 0.70% 9.36% -4.00%
FACTOR SHARES
LABOR 48.5% 45.1% 37.2% 31.8%
CAPITAL 17.3% 13.7% 15.8% 22.1%
ENERGY 18.9% 14.6% 20.8% 17.5%
MATERIALS 15.3% 26.6% 26.1% 28.5%
Source: Derived from data provided by Dale Jorgenson and Barbara Fraumeni
